The Federal Reserve Board plans to scrutinze the comensation of employees at over 5,000 U.S. banks, particuarly those of executives. The Fed would not directly set compensation, but could intervene in cases where it thinks that compensation encourages too much risk.
On one level, I think this is a good idea. Compensation policies for bank employees should reward activity that increases the long-term profitability and soundness of a bank. They should not encourage employees to pursue profits in the short-term at the expense of the long-run. For instance, paying employees on the amount of loans they write encourages them to make loans without regard to the credit-worthiness of the borrower. If an employee turns down riskier loans, he may have helped the long-run stability of his company, but at the expense of a portion of his annual salary. Why would he do such a thing, especially if he only plans to stay at the firm for a few years?
But in order for this government policy to be helpful, or even necessary, we first must assume that bank shareholders are incapable of setting up contracts that secure long-term growth in the value of their stock. If it’s easy to set up such a contract, I see no reason why bank shareholders would not do so themselves. If it’s not easy to write such a contract, what makes Federal Reserve more capable to write those contracts than the shareholders themselves (or rather, than any consultants with expertise in agency theory, which invites yet another agency problem, but that’s another story).
In the previous paragraph, I assumed that bank shareholders rationally choose the maximize long-run profits instead of short-run profits. Might bank boards act rationally by pursuit of short-term profits at the expense of the bank’s long-term stability? It certainly makes sense when they have an implicit guarantee of their liabilities from the government. Then, if the bank makes big profits, they go to the shareholders, but if it makes big losses, they get foisted off to the government. Such a guarantee encourages bank owners to play a game of “heads I win, tails you lose.”
It makes more sense to me to remove the implicit government protection from failure rather than simultaneously operate two policies that both encourage and discourage risky behavior. However, operating both policies give the Fed a measure of control over the growth of the economy that it would not have otherwise. Unless it is managed perfectly, such control will reduce the variability in the cyclical fluctuations of the economy at the expense of a lower long-term growth rate. If regulations push bank executive compensation below their fair market values, then the financial sector will struggle to get the resources it needs to provide the amount of credit it would have without regulation, which will hamper the growth of small businesses. The Fed’s move to examine pay structures indicates that it thinks the cumulative economic loss from a lower growth rate is less than the potential loss that could occur during a collapse. That, or it overestimates its own ability to correctly determine compensation for bank employees.
Ultimately, the success of this new policy depends on how heavily the Fed applies. If used sparingly, with an eye to the health of the overall financial system, the pay policy will help the Fed nudge the financial sector into a region of stability. If used often, then it will restrict the proper functioning of the credit markets, interfere with the freedom of individuals to agree to contracts, and do little to protect the health of the financial system.

Federalism: New Arguments for an Old Idea
Wednesday, January 27th, 2010Two good pieces have come out recently advocating distributing power away from the federal government in Washington towards the states and the counties: one by Alex Castellanos and the other by Arnold Kling. Castellanos writes to give the GOP a message for the 2010 electoral cycle that can reach the ears of the Millennial generation. He puts the ideas of individual liberty and free markets in terms of networks, such as Facebook. Free markets work, he argues, because their network-like structure allows coordination among individuals more efficiently than a hierarchical, top-down, command structure.
Kling, on the other hand, notes that those hierarchical command structures simply don’t work. A national government must institute a uniform policy, which can never satisfy everyone in a large country like the United States. State governments can create a variety of policies, each tailored to the different preferences of their residents. State and local governments can also respond more quickly to policy challenges because of the reduced chain of command.
Yet, neither of these articles presents any radically new ideas. James Madison outlined the federal nature of the Constitution in Federalist No. 10 and Federalist No. 39. In the Federalist No. 10, Madison argues for a large nation, so as to diminish the influence of any one faction in the body politic. With many competing interests, a government could not pass laws that benefited one group at the expense of another, such as the recent Senate heath care bill where all 49 states would pay for the costs of Nebraska’s heath care.
In Federalist No. 39, Madison explains how the Constitution conforms to republican principles and creates a government that is neither wholly federal nor wholly national. Though the federal government derives some of its powers directly from the people, but it mostly coordinates actions between the states and leaves most of the powers of government to the states:
You can find the complete Federalist Papers here: It’s like an owner’s manual for the Republic.
Tags: alex castellanos, arnold kling, federalism, federalist paper, free market, james madsion, networks
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