Archive for the ‘The Financial Crisis’ Category

Fed to Close Lending Programs

Tuesday, February 2nd, 2010

In a sign that the financial sector has returned to stable operation, the Federal Reserve closed many special lending programs started in the midst of the financial crisis in 2008:

Monday saw the end of initiatives aimed at supporting various parts of the commercial-paper market, where companies get short-term financing, along with programs to ensure key investment banks could get liquidity. Also shuttered: currency swap arrangement the Fed had with other major central banks.

Over the next several months other emergency lending programs will also make their last stands. The end of these facilities represents a move by policy makers to normalize their relationship with healing financial markets. Emergency aid withdrawn, an eventual tightening in monetary policy will follow.

Fannie and Freddie Losses Have No Limit

Monday, December 28th, 2009

From Peter Wallinson:

It’s a favorite government trick to announce bad news on a Friday afternoon, so it appears in Saturday’s paper, the least likely edition to be read. By Sunday and Monday, it’s old news. The Obama Treasury just went one better, announcing on Christmas Eve that they were uncapping the amount they believe will have to be invested in Fannie and Freddie. The Bush Treasury first estimated the government-sponsored enterprises’ (GSEs) losses at $100 billion each. The Obama administration, which has been using the GSEs to stabilize the housing market by reducing their underwriting standards, upped the ante to $200 billion each. Now the administration has thrown in the towel completely, and dropped a large lump of coal in each taxpayer’s stocking—it won’t even try to estimate the total losses of Fannie and Freddie.

The phrase “capitalism on the way up, socialism on the way down” comes to mind.

Fed to Approve Bankers’ Compensation

Thursday, September 24th, 2009

The Federal Reserve Board plans to scrutinze the comensation of employees at over 5,000 U.S. banks, particuarly those of executives.  The Fed would not directly set compensation, but could intervene in cases where it thinks that compensation encourages too much risk.

On one level, I think this is a good idea.  Compensation policies for bank employees should reward activity that increases the long-term profitability and soundness of a bank.  They should not encourage employees to pursue profits in the short-term at the expense of the long-run.  For instance, paying employees on the amount of loans they write encourages them to make loans without regard to the credit-worthiness of the borrower.  If an employee turns down riskier loans, he may have helped the long-run stability of his company, but at the expense of a portion of his annual salary.  Why would he do such a thing, especially if he only plans to stay at the firm for a few years?

But in order for this government policy to be helpful, or even necessary, we first must assume that bank shareholders are incapable of setting up contracts that secure long-term growth in the value of their stock.  If it’s easy to set up such a contract, I see no reason why bank shareholders would not do so themselves.  If it’s not easy to write such a contract, what makes Federal Reserve more capable to write those contracts than the shareholders themselves (or rather, than any consultants with expertise in agency theory, which invites yet another agency problem, but that’s another story).

In the previous paragraph, I assumed that bank shareholders rationally choose the maximize long-run profits instead of short-run profits.  Might bank boards act rationally by pursuit of short-term profits at the expense of the bank’s long-term stability?  It certainly makes sense when they have an implicit guarantee of their liabilities from the government.  Then, if the bank makes big profits, they go to the shareholders, but if it makes big losses, they get foisted off to the government.  Such a guarantee encourages bank owners to play a game of “heads I win, tails you lose.”

It makes more sense to me to remove the implicit government protection from failure rather than simultaneously operate two policies that both encourage and discourage risky behavior.  However, operating both policies give the Fed a measure of control over the growth of the economy that it would not have otherwise.  Unless it is managed perfectly, such control will reduce the variability in the cyclical fluctuations of the economy at the expense of a lower long-term growth rate.  If regulations push bank executive compensation below their fair market values, then the financial sector will struggle to get the resources it needs to provide the amount of credit it would have without regulation, which will hamper the growth of small businesses.  The Fed’s move to examine pay structures indicates that it thinks the cumulative economic loss from a lower growth rate is less than the potential loss that could occur during a collapse.  That, or it overestimates its own ability to correctly determine compensation for bank employees.

Ultimately, the success of this new policy depends on how heavily the Fed applies.  If used sparingly, with an eye to the health of the overall financial system, the pay policy will help the Fed nudge the financial sector into a region of stability.  If used often, then it will restrict the proper functioning of the credit markets, interfere with the freedom of individuals to agree to contracts, and do little to protect the health of the financial system.

Breaking the Bank

Wednesday, June 17th, 2009

Frontline has produced an excellent documentary on financial crisis, focusing primarily on the merger between Bank of America and Merrill Lynch. You can find the program in its entirety on the PBS website:

Breaking the Bank (Frontline – June 16th, 2009)

Economic Thoughts from “The Week-Long Feud of the Century”

Friday, March 13th, 2009

Jim Cramer’s criticism of the Obama administration’s failure to address the housing market and the banking crisis has brought him, and his network, CNBC, under some media scrutiny.  Jon Stewart’s lengthy tirade against the network, Cramer, and Rick Santelli, another CNBC anchor who has criticized the administration, sparked a short media feud between the hosts of the Daily Show and Mad Money.  On Thursday night, Cramer appeared on the Daily Show with Stewart to discuss the feud and aspects of the current economic situation, including the risk of investing, asymmetric information, risk and reward, incentive structures, business ethics, and the role of media.  The video of the episode is embedded below.

Stewart complained that those saving for retirement are “capitalizing [hedge fund managers'] adventure.” But that’s exactly the point!  Fund managers, be they for ultra-exclusive hedge funds, corporate pension funds, university endowments, or plain, old mutual funds, take your savings, invest in the most profitable companies they can find, and return the profits to you.  They act as financial intermediaries, channelling capital from those who have an excess (people who want to save for retirement) to those who need it (businesses, from start-up entrepreneurs to multi-national corporations).  Savers should not just hand over their money to any manager; they should do the requisite homework before investing, just to be sure they are not financing an incompetent manager, or worse, the next Bernie Madoff.  Proper homework is essential for profitable investing; several people knew Madoff was a fraud before the SEC indicted him (Aksia, Harry Markopolos, Leon Gross, and Joan Hill).  Cramer, both on his show and in his books, urges people to do the homework on their investments.  Stewart, and I assume many others like him, incorrectly expect saving for retirement to be risk-free.

Unfortunately, asymmetric information, the fact that fund managers know more about their investments than the savers supplying them with money, limits voluntary exchange in the absence of regulation providing full disclosure.  Such regulation is what makes it possible for savers to do homework in the first place.  However, over-regulation has given companies the incentive to shift their risky activities away from the front of the business and into structured investment vehicles, collateralized debt obligations, and other esoteric derivative products that obscure the true nature of investments.  Credit default swaps and other forms of insurance gave regulators, bond rating agencies, and the public at large the impression that these investments were of low risk or risk-free when, in fact, they were not.  The process of shifting business activities from a risky, highly-regulated sector to a lightly-regulated sector is often referred to as regulatory arbitrage.  Regulators can reduce the opportunities for regulatory arbitrage by reducing, rather than increasing, the amount of regulation, which provides businesses with the incentive to conduct operations in a transparent environment.  With the proper disclosure, investors can purchase assets that properly reflect their tastes for risk.  

We can’t exact moral behavior out of traders by compulsion alone.  They will always seek to evade regulation and the fiats of governmental authorities until they voluntarily decide to invest morally.  Demands for more action by regulators are essentially the same as the cry “can’t someone else do it?”.  Instead we should seek to cultivate a higher place for moral standards in our society, both for the mangers of investment funds and for those who supply them with capital.  Socially-responsible investment funds, supporting causes ranging from Catholic values to environmental sustainability, have increased their assets under management in recent years.  Stewart very correctly points out that “all of [the traders for companies needing bailout funds] incentives were for short-term profit.  Such a change in investor sentiment away from “profit above all else” to “profit and ethics” would eliminate those incentives for short-term profit and reduce most of the shady activities promoted by Cramer in that embarrassing 2006 video and criticized by Stewart and the present-day Cramer.  

It is ironic that Stewart comes down on the financial media so hard for producing coverage that fuels this focus on the short-term at the expense of the long term.  His own program, like Cramer’s Mad Money, is geared toward an American audience that has a decreasing attention span and a strong desire to fuse entertainment with information.  He lambastes Cramer for not ousting more of the problems on Wall Street, yet the Daily Show rose to prominence making fun of media who were not properly hard on the subjects they interviewed.  In 2004, Stewart faced similar criticism from CNN host Tucker Carlson, which caused him to fall back on the defense of “I’m a comedian on a fake news show.”  Why does he expect more from a guy who throws around foam bulls and bears and endorses stock picks by way of a wacky sound board?  Yet, the hypocrisy of Stewart’s allegation does not make it any less true.  Once again, the problem lies not with Stewart and Cramer, for they have a financial incentive to blur entertainment and information on their shows; it lies with American public whose continued viewership makes those shows financially viable.

Inflation is a Short-sighted Solution

Friday, January 30th, 2009

In this recent opinion piece in the Financial Times, Crispin Odey argues that excess debt holds down the economy and a healthy dose of inflation would reduce the value of current, outstanding debt, thus fixing the economy.  While he is right that excess debt endangers businesses’ and households’ financial soundness, and that inflation reduces the real value of outstanding debt, either a temporary or a permanently higher rate of inflation would solve this crisis at the expense of future economic growth.

When a business takes on debt, it uses other people’s money to purchase assets.  The amount a business uses other people’s money is called leverage, because debt multiples profits (and losses) like a lever multiplies the force exerted at one end in order to exert a greater force at the other.  Financial analysts commonly use the debt-to-equity ratio to measure a firm’s leverage.  For example, a business with $1,000,000 in assets but only $100,000 in equity has $900,000 in debt — a debt-to-equity ration of 9.  A business with $100,000 in equity and $50,000 in debt has a debt-to-equity ratio of 0.5.  

Furthermore, suppose the business can make a 10% return on assets.  The highly-leveraged business generates $100,000 of revenue using only $100,000 of equity — a 100% return.  The lowly-leveraged business generates $15,000 of revenue using $100,000 of equity — a 15% return.  When the economy is good, leverage can help increase profits.  But when the economy is bad, that 10% return on assets could just as easily be a 10% loss.  In that case, the lowly-leveraged firm suffers only a 15% loss, whereas the highly-leveraged firm is bankrupt.

Inflation, or rising prices, diminishes the real value of debt because the amount of money initially borrowed can buy less goods when it is repaid.  A higher rate of inflation would stabilize highly-leveraged firms, but at the expense of creditors, the people who made highly leveraged firms’ profits in the first place.

Think about how creditors would respond if the official government response to financial crises were a deliberate inflation.  In that case, the firms taking on the debt make great profits when the economy is good, but the government, through a deliberate inflation, transfers the great losses to the creditors.  A deliberate inflation is a deliberate transfer of wealth from the responsible to the irresponsible. Given the options of modest profits or huge losses, creditors will either ask for higher interest rates or stop making loans altogether.  Neither option helps the economy as a whole.

Constantly changing prices make it hard for businesses to plan long-term projects.  Inflation increases uncertainty.  And just look at what the uncertainty regarding the value of mortgage backed securities, the ad hoc application of the TARP, and the continued threat of further government intervention has done to the economy.  In the face of uncertain decisions, people just stop trading.  They wait to make a decision until they have a better idea of what might happen.  Higher inflation might help in the short run, but it does not help sustainable economic growth.

GM Should File For Chapter 11

Wednesday, November 19th, 2008

In a VoxEU piece, Joshua Rauh and Luigi Zingales argue that a bailout for GM is a terrible idea. How bad of an idea is it?; “it would be better to give away that money directly to the workers rather than let GM decide how to dissipate it.” That translates into at least $200,000 for every GM employee in North America.

GM and the rest of the Big Three have been in financial trouble for years. Their costly pension obligations make them uncompetitive and their products are simply undesirable. GM needs to reorganize to become a more competitive company. Rauh and Zingales outline seven major elements of a Chapter 11 reorganization:

1. GM must secure debtor-in-possession financing.
2. The financing should be structured to prevent GM from wasting resources.
3. The bankruptcy should avoid setting off a chain of bankruptcies in GM’s suppliers and dealerships.
4. GM must be a smaller company after bankruptcy.
5. GM needs to reduce its pension obligations.
6. GM needs to reduce its retiree medical care liabilities.
7. Warranties on GM cars need to be insured.

But unfortunately for Rauh and Zingales, the decision belongs to Congress. Their plan makes just enough sense to anger everyone; Democratic constituencies will push to cover more guarantees to the workers, while Republican constituencies will push not to put any taxpayer money at risk. It would behoove some members of Congress to take control of this issue and convince the American people that this is the solution in the best interests of the company, the employees, and the public.

Further Reading:
Lemon of a Bailout” by Charles Krauthammer — Real Clear Politics

Why Car Companies Should Not Get a Bailout

Sunday, November 16th, 2008

Shortly after Congress and the White House finished enacting legislation to prevent a collapse of the financial sector, other companies started lining up to petition the federal government for aid.  First in line are the Big 3 car manufacturers — Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler.  Already, the car companies have received $25 billion in loans from the governmentPresident-elect Obama has indicated his willingness to consider additional aid, presumably in the form of capital injections.  While government intervention in the financial sector was distasteful, but necessary, the next Congress and Administration would do well to refrain from assisting other companies outside of the financial sector.

Many Americans are still confused as to why the financial sector needs public assistance because bank runs and financial panics, which used to be fairly regular occurrences, have been notably absent in recent years.  During a panic, depositors rush to withdraw their money from banks out of a fear that the banks will go out of business.  When this happens, banks that made prudent investment decisions can find themselves out of money to continue operations.  Thus, the fear that a bank will go under becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy.  As the number of banks the fail grows, the panic spreads as more depositors decide to withdraw their money and put it under the mattress.  The uniformity of banks’ product (money from one bank spends just as well as money from another) and the overlapping financing agreements (banks borrow from other banks, just like every other company) create conditions for a panic to spread quickly across the entire industry, affecting both well-managed and poorly-managed companies.

Financial panics have a long history of affecting the broader economy.  The Panics of 1873, 1893, and 1907, as well the Great Contraction of 1929-1933 were all followed by a recession or depression.  Businesses depend on financing both for their daily operations and for investment in new, more productive capital.  When the cost of that financing goes up or simply becomes unavailable, businesses are forced to cut back on their activity.  They stop hiring new employees or fire some of the ones they already have.  Panics hit small businesses and start-up companies harder than larger companies because they are more dependent on financing.  Those companies are the ones that provide most of the new innovation, new investment, and new employment.

Bank failures are particularly devastating because the financial sector creates money when it makes loans.  When banks make less loans or even lose money and go out of business, the supply of money goes down.  When the supply of money goes down, the price of money, or the interest rate, goes up.  That’s why it’s harder for businesses to get financing.  The decreased supply of money means that each remaining dollar is more valuable.  The equation of exchange also relates the supply of money to the price level and the amount of real output in the economy, or the gross domestic product (GDP).  With less money in the economy, either prices, GDP, or both will fall because consumers have less money available to pay for goods and services.  The is exactly what is happening in the housing market.  House prices are falling because the credit crunch reduces the number of potential buyers for any particular home, which causes sale prices to be lower than they otherwise would be.  Conversely, the easy credit of the past few years increased the number of potential buyers for any house, which increased prices way above what they were intrinsically worth.  Accordingly, the amount of home sales has risen and fallen with the amount of money.  The same principle applies to markets for other goods and services, though on a smaller scale for items whose transactions are not dependent on credit.

However, car companies are not interconnected to the same degree that financial companies are.  The Big 3 car companies get their financing from banks, not from each other, so the failure of one will not endanger the business of the others (if anything it would help the remaining firms by removing a competitor).  Nor would the failure of one of the Big 3 put other car companies at an increased risk of failure, like in a bank panic.  The number of lenders to the automobile industry is small compared to the number of lenders to the financial industry (everyone with a deposit in a bank), so a panic is unlikely to spread.

A failure of one of the Big 3 would not spread to the rest of the economy in the same way that a failure of several financial companies would.  The losers when a car company goes out of business, the shareholders and lenders, are less than when a financial firm goes under.  Yes, GM’s or Ford’s or Chrysler’s  failure would adversely affect its suppliers and consumers, but the number businesses depend on any one of those companies is small compared to the number of business that depend on access to credit.  Additionally, suppliers can adjust and continue to do business with the remaining firms, because the failure of one car company does not put the others at risk.

Bailout proponents argue that a failure of one of the Big 3 would mean thousands of Americans would lose their jobs.  Yet not once was that argument used to advocate aid to financial companies, despite the fact that they are major employers too.  In 2005, the auto industry employed 1.1 million workers (Department of Commerce).  Yet, the financial services industry employed about 8 million in 2005 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, page 8).  If employment wasn’t a factor in aiding the financial industry, why should it matter when the auto industry employs only one-eighth of the workers? The employment argument reveals the self-serving nature and lack of public benefit behind the auto industry bailout.  Other than the employment justification, bailout proponents have little on which to stand other than, “Why not us, too?’

It’s clear that the financial is drastically different from other industries because of its central position in the economy.  The Big 3 auto makers are no more important to the economy than Microsoft, McDonald’s, GE, Coca-Cola, IBM, Wal-Mart, or any other large corporation with many employees.  So if one of the Big 3 gets a bailout, every other large corporation has just as much of an incentive to come to the federal government for aid.  Where do we draw the line for helping some companies and not others?

Additionally, the federal government, with its large deficit and expanding entitlement obligations, faces the same financial problem that GM, Ford, and Chrysler faced a decade ago.  Expanding aid to businesses will not improve the government’s balance sheet any further.  Who will be around to bail out the government once it can no longer meet its obligations?

Giving aid to mis-managed companies creates what economits call moral hazard.  When insured against failure, companies take more risks and make more bad decisions than they ordinarily would.  The fear of failure in a free market forces companies to be diligent and invest in only the most profitable resources.  Without proper management, companies will depend heavily on public aid rather than take responsibility for their own business.

So to recap, the financial industry is crucial because every company, including other financial companies, depends on banks for financing.  The failure of one major financial firm can spark a panic that can quickly spread to other financial firms and then to the broader economy.  A similar failure in the automobile industry will not spread across the industry in the same way.  Whereas it is in the public interest to provide aid to well-managed, but unlucky, financial firms, the public should not provide aid to mis-managed automobile companies.  If politicians feel compelled to lavish money on the Big 3, they should follow Lynne Kiesling’s suggestion and provide retraining and unemployment assistance to unemployed workers as they transition to new, more productive jobs.

Further Reading:

Saving Detroit” — The Economist

Bailout to Nowere” by David Brooks — New York Times

Bankruptcy and GM” by Jim Manzi

The Big Three Bailout Debate” — CNN/Money

Carmakers should get their share of the bailout” by David Greising — Chicago Tribune

The Big Three are a National Disgrace” by Daniel Gross — Slate

Fixing the Housing Market: Modify Loans, Change the Bankruptcy Code, or Stimulate Demand?

Wednesday, November 12th, 2008

This morning, three plans have come up to stop the deflation, or price decline, in the housing market. One, from the Federal Housing Finance Authority, the new regulator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, advocates restructuring mortgages to reduce borrowers’ payments. The idea behind this plan is that if borrowers could make lower monthly payments, then less homeowners would default on their mortgages, which would stop the vicious cycle of price declines leading to foreclosures leading to price declines.

Not a terrible idea, but there are a few problems. One is the size of the program’s effect. I haven’t done any meaningful calculations yet, but the Real Time Economics article indicates that only 9% of the homeowners are in default. The plan would further exclude second-homeowners and speculators, since helping these groups is politically unpopular, further reducing the program’s effectiveness. However, the contract law implications of the plan worry me more. If the government can step in at any time and “encourage” two parties to re-negotiate a contract, then the original agreement becomes less meaningful. Decreased faith in a contract will lead both to decreased reliance on a contract (risky and needy mortgage applicants will find it harder to get approved in the first place) and an increased compensation for the higher risk of coerced re-negotiation (mortgage interest rates should rise). This plan might help in the short-run, but it will hurt the mortgage market in the long-run.

The Real Time Economics article also cites a plan advocated by Senator Charles Schumer to restructure the bankruptcy code. The current code provides a perverse incentive for borrowers with negative equity to walk away from their mortgages and declare bankruptcy. Since the bank can only take a homeowner’s home and not any other assets, a rational homeowner has no reason to make payments on a mortgage that will cost him or her more than what the house is worth. Removing this incentive will help stem the tide of foreclosures, but is not likely to be politically popular. Banks should able to receive some, not all, of the original value of the loan, since they had just as much of a hand in originating the bad loan as the borrower.

The the third plan, proposed by Alan Meltzer of Carnegie-Mellon University, aims to stimulate demand by allowing new homeowners to deduct their down payment on their income taxes or by reducing the tax rate for anyone who buys a house between now and 2010, or by both measures at the same time. To me, this cuts to the root of the problem, the excess supply of unsold homes. It doesn’t let the government target specific homeowners while excluding others; it adjusts the incentives in the housing market and allows the market to work out a solution. The downside is that, barring an increase in taxes or a reduction in spending, a tax credit or cut only adds to the national debt. As a fiscal stimulus, it doesn’t do much to increase consumption, but I don’t think that was the plan’s original purpose. I think this is one of the better solutions put forward so far.

Anna Schwartz on the Federal Reserve, Asset Bubbles, and the Financial Crisis

Friday, November 7th, 2008

A recent interview with Anna Schwartz in the Wall Street Journal raised some interesting questions on how the Federal Reserve should respond not only to the current financial crisis, but to monetary policy in general. She blames the Fed both for its accommodative stance toward failing banks and losses in the market, but also for a reluctance to let the stock market fall that created the current crisis in the first place.

In part, the Fed pursues an easy money policy because it’s supposed to. Under the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, the Federal Reserve has a dual mandate — to pursue both “price stability” and “maximum employment.” The problem is that the Fed can’t do both at the same time. In the NFL, they say if a coach thinks he has two starting quarterbacks, he really has none. In the same way that a football coach has to decide on one starting quarterback, a central bank has to decide on one of maximum employment or price stability to pursue a consistent monetary policy.

Schwartz notes here that crashes are caused by asset bubbles, which are a symptom of the Fed’s inability of to decide on one objective for its monetary policy. In the most recent easing cycle before the current one, the Fed cut rates to cushion the fallout from the dot-com bubble burst. Cheap credit helped fuel another asset bubble in housing, which caused the Fed to raise rates. Now, the housing bubble has burst and the Fed is easing again to keep the economy from collapsing. And once again, at least before the failure of Fannie and Freddie raised risk spreads, the loose policy was fueling a commodities bubble. A dual mandate encourages this type of ping-pong monetary policy, where the solution to one problem is the cause of another.

There are two common alternatives to the discretionary policy scheme currently in place at the Fed. One is inflation targeting, where the central bank sets a range for the inflation rate and conducts policy to keep the rate of rise in prices within its comfort range. The Bank of England and the European Central Bank both have published inflation targets. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s governor can even be dismissed if the bank fails to meet its inflation target.

An inflation target anchors inflation expectation by clearly communicating to households and firms what inflation rate the central bank intends to allow. It allows for some flexibility by having the target as a range rather than a specific number.

The other policy regime, which Milton Friedman advocated, is an explicit, pre-determined growth rate in the supply of money, for instance 3% per year. Instead of holding regular meetings to gauge the state of the economy, central bank officials would simply administer the pre-determined increases in the money supply.

The drawback to this is that any external shocks, say an oil embargo devastating hurricane or terrorist, get passed through to employment. Current policy allows the Federal Reserve to respond to these shocks to cushion their affects on the economy. But then again that’s Friedman and Schwartz’ point: in trying to be the monetary superhero, the Fed ends up causing more problems than it solves.

Further Reading:
The Structure and Function of the Federal Reserve System — Congressional Research Service
The Goals of U.S. Monetary Policy — The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
The Fed’s Monetary Policy Rule — William Poole, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Monetary Policy and the Legacy of Milton Friedman — Anna Schwartz