Shortly after Congress and the White House finished enacting legislation to prevent a collapse of the financial sector, other companies started lining up to petition the federal government for aid. First in line are the Big 3 car manufacturers — Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler. Already, the car companies have received $25 billion in loans from the government. President-elect Obama has indicated his willingness to consider additional aid, presumably in the form of capital injections. While government intervention in the financial sector was distasteful, but necessary, the next Congress and Administration would do well to refrain from assisting other companies outside of the financial sector.
Many Americans are still confused as to why the financial sector needs public assistance because bank runs and financial panics, which used to be fairly regular occurrences, have been notably absent in recent years. During a panic, depositors rush to withdraw their money from banks out of a fear that the banks will go out of business. When this happens, banks that made prudent investment decisions can find themselves out of money to continue operations. Thus, the fear that a bank will go under becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy. As the number of banks the fail grows, the panic spreads as more depositors decide to withdraw their money and put it under the mattress. The uniformity of banks’ product (money from one bank spends just as well as money from another) and the overlapping financing agreements (banks borrow from other banks, just like every other company) create conditions for a panic to spread quickly across the entire industry, affecting both well-managed and poorly-managed companies.
Financial panics have a long history of affecting the broader economy. The Panics of 1873, 1893, and 1907, as well the Great Contraction of 1929-1933 were all followed by a recession or depression. Businesses depend on financing both for their daily operations and for investment in new, more productive capital. When the cost of that financing goes up or simply becomes unavailable, businesses are forced to cut back on their activity. They stop hiring new employees or fire some of the ones they already have. Panics hit small businesses and start-up companies harder than larger companies because they are more dependent on financing. Those companies are the ones that provide most of the new innovation, new investment, and new employment.
Bank failures are particularly devastating because the financial sector creates money when it makes loans. When banks make less loans or even lose money and go out of business, the supply of money goes down. When the supply of money goes down, the price of money, or the interest rate, goes up. That’s why it’s harder for businesses to get financing. The decreased supply of money means that each remaining dollar is more valuable. The equation of exchange also relates the supply of money to the price level and the amount of real output in the economy, or the gross domestic product (GDP). With less money in the economy, either prices, GDP, or both will fall because consumers have less money available to pay for goods and services. The is exactly what is happening in the housing market. House prices are falling because the credit crunch reduces the number of potential buyers for any particular home, which causes sale prices to be lower than they otherwise would be. Conversely, the easy credit of the past few years increased the number of potential buyers for any house, which increased prices way above what they were intrinsically worth. Accordingly, the amount of home sales has risen and fallen with the amount of money. The same principle applies to markets for other goods and services, though on a smaller scale for items whose transactions are not dependent on credit.
However, car companies are not interconnected to the same degree that financial companies are. The Big 3 car companies get their financing from banks, not from each other, so the failure of one will not endanger the business of the others (if anything it would help the remaining firms by removing a competitor). Nor would the failure of one of the Big 3 put other car companies at an increased risk of failure, like in a bank panic. The number of lenders to the automobile industry is small compared to the number of lenders to the financial industry (everyone with a deposit in a bank), so a panic is unlikely to spread.
A failure of one of the Big 3 would not spread to the rest of the economy in the same way that a failure of several financial companies would. The losers when a car company goes out of business, the shareholders and lenders, are less than when a financial firm goes under. Yes, GM’s or Ford’s or Chrysler’s failure would adversely affect its suppliers and consumers, but the number businesses depend on any one of those companies is small compared to the number of business that depend on access to credit. Additionally, suppliers can adjust and continue to do business with the remaining firms, because the failure of one car company does not put the others at risk.
Bailout proponents argue that a failure of one of the Big 3 would mean thousands of Americans would lose their jobs. Yet not once was that argument used to advocate aid to financial companies, despite the fact that they are major employers too. In 2005, the auto industry employed 1.1 million workers (Department of Commerce). Yet, the financial services industry employed about 8 million in 2005 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, page 8). If employment wasn’t a factor in aiding the financial industry, why should it matter when the auto industry employs only one-eighth of the workers? The employment argument reveals the self-serving nature and lack of public benefit behind the auto industry bailout. Other than the employment justification, bailout proponents have little on which to stand other than, “Why not us, too?’
It’s clear that the financial is drastically different from other industries because of its central position in the economy. The Big 3 auto makers are no more important to the economy than Microsoft, McDonald’s, GE, Coca-Cola, IBM, Wal-Mart, or any other large corporation with many employees. So if one of the Big 3 gets a bailout, every other large corporation has just as much of an incentive to come to the federal government for aid. Where do we draw the line for helping some companies and not others?
Additionally, the federal government, with its large deficit and expanding entitlement obligations, faces the same financial problem that GM, Ford, and Chrysler faced a decade ago. Expanding aid to businesses will not improve the government’s balance sheet any further. Who will be around to bail out the government once it can no longer meet its obligations?
Giving aid to mis-managed companies creates what economits call moral hazard. When insured against failure, companies take more risks and make more bad decisions than they ordinarily would. The fear of failure in a free market forces companies to be diligent and invest in only the most profitable resources. Without proper management, companies will depend heavily on public aid rather than take responsibility for their own business.
So to recap, the financial industry is crucial because every company, including other financial companies, depends on banks for financing. The failure of one major financial firm can spark a panic that can quickly spread to other financial firms and then to the broader economy. A similar failure in the automobile industry will not spread across the industry in the same way. Whereas it is in the public interest to provide aid to well-managed, but unlucky, financial firms, the public should not provide aid to mis-managed automobile companies. If politicians feel compelled to lavish money on the Big 3, they should follow Lynne Kiesling’s suggestion and provide retraining and unemployment assistance to unemployed workers as they transition to new, more productive jobs.
Further Reading:
“Saving Detroit” — The Economist
“Bailout to Nowere” by David Brooks — New York Times
“Bankruptcy and GM” by Jim Manzi
“The Big Three Bailout Debate” — CNN/Money
“Carmakers should get their share of the bailout” by David Greising — Chicago Tribune
“The Big Three are a National Disgrace” by Daniel Gross — Slate
Fed to Approve Bankers’ Compensation
Thursday, September 24th, 2009The Federal Reserve Board plans to scrutinze the comensation of employees at over 5,000 U.S. banks, particuarly those of executives. The Fed would not directly set compensation, but could intervene in cases where it thinks that compensation encourages too much risk.
On one level, I think this is a good idea. Compensation policies for bank employees should reward activity that increases the long-term profitability and soundness of a bank. They should not encourage employees to pursue profits in the short-term at the expense of the long-run. For instance, paying employees on the amount of loans they write encourages them to make loans without regard to the credit-worthiness of the borrower. If an employee turns down riskier loans, he may have helped the long-run stability of his company, but at the expense of a portion of his annual salary. Why would he do such a thing, especially if he only plans to stay at the firm for a few years?
But in order for this government policy to be helpful, or even necessary, we first must assume that bank shareholders are incapable of setting up contracts that secure long-term growth in the value of their stock. If it’s easy to set up such a contract, I see no reason why bank shareholders would not do so themselves. If it’s not easy to write such a contract, what makes Federal Reserve more capable to write those contracts than the shareholders themselves (or rather, than any consultants with expertise in agency theory, which invites yet another agency problem, but that’s another story).
In the previous paragraph, I assumed that bank shareholders rationally choose the maximize long-run profits instead of short-run profits. Might bank boards act rationally by pursuit of short-term profits at the expense of the bank’s long-term stability? It certainly makes sense when they have an implicit guarantee of their liabilities from the government. Then, if the bank makes big profits, they go to the shareholders, but if it makes big losses, they get foisted off to the government. Such a guarantee encourages bank owners to play a game of “heads I win, tails you lose.”
It makes more sense to me to remove the implicit government protection from failure rather than simultaneously operate two policies that both encourage and discourage risky behavior. However, operating both policies give the Fed a measure of control over the growth of the economy that it would not have otherwise. Unless it is managed perfectly, such control will reduce the variability in the cyclical fluctuations of the economy at the expense of a lower long-term growth rate. If regulations push bank executive compensation below their fair market values, then the financial sector will struggle to get the resources it needs to provide the amount of credit it would have without regulation, which will hamper the growth of small businesses. The Fed’s move to examine pay structures indicates that it thinks the cumulative economic loss from a lower growth rate is less than the potential loss that could occur during a collapse. That, or it overestimates its own ability to correctly determine compensation for bank employees.
Ultimately, the success of this new policy depends on how heavily the Fed applies. If used sparingly, with an eye to the health of the overall financial system, the pay policy will help the Fed nudge the financial sector into a region of stability. If used often, then it will restrict the proper functioning of the credit markets, interfere with the freedom of individuals to agree to contracts, and do little to protect the health of the financial system.
Tags: agency, compensation, federal reserve, free market, growth rate, regulation
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